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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 20-2887
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MIGUEL SCOTT ARNOLD, a/k/a Midnight,
Appellant
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1:17-cr-00002-001)
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 7, 2021
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed July 29, 2021)

OPINION*
AMBRO, Circuit Judge

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Miguel Arnold appeals his sex-trafficking convictions.

He argues there was

insufficient evidence to support one of his convictions, the indictment was impermissibly
duplicitous (meaning it joined two or more offenses in the same count), and the District
Court constructively amended the indictment. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
I.

Background

In January 2017, a grand jury indicted Miguel Arnold and four co-defendants.
Arnold was indicted on five counts, including conspiracy to commit sex trafficking by
force, fraud, and coercion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c), and the substantive offense
of sex trafficking of multiple victims in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), (b)(1). One of
the co-defendants, but not Arnold, was charged with sex trafficking of a minor.
At trial, the Government contended that Arnold was the ringleader of a single
conspiracy to commit sex trafficking. The defense conceded that Arnold was a trafficker
but suggested he did not operate within a hierarchical conspiracy. Instead, the defense
argued, Arnold was part of a less formal, “family”-like group of traffickers, each of whom
had a separate trafficking operation. App. at 525, 528.
During the proceedings, the Government offered evidence that underage victims
were trafficked without any timely objection from Arnold. The Government also presented
testimony about the age of certain victims to establish their susceptibility to force, fraud,
and coercion. Later in the proceedings, Arnold objected to the presentation of this
evidence, but the Court overruled his objection.
After a five-day trial, the jury convicted Arnold on four counts. The District Court
then sentenced him to 300 months in prison. He appeals.
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II.

Discussion1

Arnold raises three claims on appeal. None is persuasive.
A.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

First, Arnold argues that the Government presented insufficient evidence to support
its theory of a single, large-scale conspiracy, and instead only proved that he and his codefendants were involved in separate and independent conspiracies. We evaluate “whether
the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, contains substantial
evidence to support the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir.
1989) (internal citations omitted). For a single conspiracy, we use a three-pronged test:
First, we examine whether there was a common goal among the conspirators
. . . . Second, we look at the nature of the scheme to determine whether the
agreement contemplated bringing to pass a continuous result that will not
continue without the continuous cooperation of the conspirators . . . . Third,
we examine the extent to which the participants overlap in the various
dealings.
Id. at 259 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Arnold asserts that the Government’s evidence failed on all prongs of the Kelly test;
hence a rational juror could not have determined there was a unified conspiracy. However,
the District Court properly instructed the jury on the difference between single and multiple
conspiracies, and significant evidence supports the jury’s finding that Arnold and his codefendants operated a single conspiracy.
On the first Kelly prong, the Government presented evidence that Arnold and his
co-defendants knew each other and worked together toward the common goal of engaging
1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
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in sex trafficking. For example, the Government demonstrated that Arnold and his codefendants worked as drivers for each other, recruited victims together, coordinated motel
stays, collaborated to recover on debts, traded victims to each other, and offered joint “twofor-one” services where their prostitutes would work together to offer services at a
discounted rate. The Government also presented evidence that Arnold had monitored
interactions between his co-defendants and the police, which suggested a close relationship
between the co-defendants’ activities.
On the second prong, the Government presented evidence of interdependence
among Arnold and his co-defendants. In addition to the evidence described above, there
was testimony at trial that Arnold himself said he and his co-defendants were “all a family,
we all do this together.” App. at 271. Finally, the third prong cuts against Arnold due to
significant overlap in activity between the various co-defendants.
Drawing all inferences in the Government’s favor, as we must, we hold that a
rational juror could conclude Arnold and his co-defendants operated a single conspiracy.
We thus reject his first argument.
B.

Duplicitous Charges

Arnold contends the indictment on Count 2, a sex trafficking charge based on
“multiple victims,” was duplicitous. He did not raise this issue before the District Court;
we therefore review for plain error, which requires that: (1) there was an error, (2) it was
plain, (3) it affected substantial rights, and (4) not correcting it would “seriously affect[]
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). An
4

error is plain if it is “obvious” or “clear under current law.” United States v. Vazquez, 271
F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734).
Assuming without deciding that there was an error on this issue, it was not plain.
In analyzing allegedly duplicitous indictments, we must determine the appropriate “unit
of prosecution,” United States v. Root, 585 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2009), meaning, in this
case, whether the charges must be separated out by victim or whether it is permissible to
combine multiple victims in one count. Neither we nor the Supreme Court have
addressed the allowable unit of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), the statute at issue
here. “It is generally true that lack of precedent alone will not prevent us from finding
plain error.” United States v. Jabateh, 974 F.3d 281, 299 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “for relief under the stringent Olano
standard, novel questions . . . must be capable of measurement against some other
absolutely clear legal norm.” Id. (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets
omitted). There was no “absolutely clear legal norm” on this issue. We therefore reject
Arnold’s second argument.
C.

Constructive Amendment of the Indictment

Third, Arnold claims the District Court constructively amended the indictment by
allowing evidence that some of the victims were minors, even though Arnold was not
personally indicted on the separate charge of trafficking a minor. Constructive
amendment occurs “when evidence, arguments, or the district court’s jury instructions
effectively ‘amend[] the indictment by broadening the possible bases for conviction from
that which appeared in the indictment.’” United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 229 (3d
5

Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Lee, 359 F.3d 194, 208 (3d Cir. 2004)). Permitting
evidence about the age of certain victims did not broaden the possible bases for
convicting Arnold. As to him, that evidence was offered only to support the elements of
the offenses with which he was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1591. That statute required
the Government to prove that force, fraud, or coercion were used to cause a victim to
engage in a commercial sex act. The age of the victim in Arnold’s case was a relevant
consideration to show the victim’s susceptibility to fraud, force, or coercion, even though
he was not separately charged with trafficking a minor. Thus we see no error.
*

*

*

*

*

We thus affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction.
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